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Abstract 
The relationship between aid and voting in UN agencies has been well documented in the aid 
literature. We extend this analysis to the wider field of international negotiations, outside the 
sphere of formal voting, where decisions are mostly taken by consensus. Is aid used 
strategically to influence the negotiations in this context, too? Based on a novel dataset on 
negotiation behavior under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change we assess 
whether countries obtaining aid react by expressing increased support and/or reduced 
opposition towards the donor. Applying linear and instrumental variable regressions on a 
three-dimensional panel dataset with donor-recipient dyads for the period 2002-2013 enables 
us to distinguish between long-term partnerships and the strategic use of aid for the purpose 
of the negotiations. We find that aid can indeed buy support in the climate negotiations, but 
that this opportunity tends to be limited to mitigation and adaptation aid, rather than general 
aid. We argue that this is due to both greater demand for and greater supply of these specific 
types of aid, whose allocation is under the direct responsibility of the specialized delegates 
participating in the negotiations.  
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Buying support at international negotiations:  
The strategic use of climate aid 
“Mr. President, I deeply regret that European delegation offered money here  
for adoption of this document.”1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The strategic allocation of development aid is well documented in the existing literature on 
UN voting. Through the strategic use of aid, donor countries induce aid recipient countries to 
vote in line with their positions on important issues discussed at the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) (Dreher et al. 2008) or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
(Kuziemko and Werker 2006). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic use of aid may 
go beyond this and also be relevant in the broader context of international negotiations, to 
ensure support or avoid opposition even when there are no formal votes. Consensus decisions 
rather than majority voting are a widespread phenomenon in international politics. Even in 
organizations like UNGA that also use majority voting, most decisions are taken by 
consensus (Häge and Hug 2016). We suggest that buying support should be relevant in these 
contexts, too. Motives can range from pushing forward a certain agenda, to avoiding public 
criticism that may put the government in a negative light in the international media and 
influence national constituents.  
We study this phenomenon in the field of global environmental politics. As in many other 
fields, decisions are taken by consensus, and therefore formal votes play a much lesser role 
than positional statements within the negotiations. Our new dataset describing negotiation 
behavior under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
allows us to assess statements of support and opposition towards other parties’ positions, 
rather than voting (Castro 2017). At regular meetings of the UNFCCC bodies, country 
delegates negotiate a wide variety of climate-related issues ranging from implementation and 
monitoring of the performance of existing measures and agreements, to the preparation of 
                                                   
 
1 Statement of a Cuban delegate at the UNFCCC meeting in Copenhagen, quoted by Dimitrov (2010, 
p. 813). 
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new agreements relating to mitigation, adaptation, the provision of financial and technical 
support, among others. Using the summaries of these negotiation meetings published in the 
Earth Negotiations Bulletins (ENBs), we code the instances in which one country agrees with 
or opposes the positions expressed by its peers, as well as the negotiation issue to which this 
support or opposition relates.  
On this basis, we identify the role of aid as a strategic tool in a country’s negotiation strategy.2 
Is increased aid related to greater support and less opposition? If so, is this any aid, or only 
such funding that is directly related to the area under negotiation, i.e., in our context, aid for 
the adaptation to or the mitigation of global climate change? Different causal pathways are 
consistent with such a correlation: Does aid lead to a better understanding and hence greater 
alignment between the donor and the recipient, is it directly used to obtain more favorable 
statements by the recipient country, or is it used ex post to reward or punish potential 
recipients depending on their negotiation behavior? 
Section 2 reviews what we know from the extant literature on aid and voting as well as the 
relevant literature on negotiation behavior. Section 3 provides the conceptual framework for 
our analysis and derives the hypotheses that will then be tested based on data and methods 
described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results of a three-dimensional panel analysis, 
and uses a variety of fixed effects approaches and a placebo test based on a novel 
interpretation of instrumental variable approaches to improve our understanding of the causal 
relationship between aid and negotiation support. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Insights from existing literature 
This article brings together scholarship on international negotiations with the literature on UN 
voting. Within the negotiations literature, several concepts can help us understand how or 
why aid could be used strategically to encourage specific negotiation behavior. Threats and 
promises are well-known negotiation tactics (Hovi 1998; Odell 2000; Odell 2002; Dür and 
Mateo 2010; Bailer 2012). Clearly, the commitment to provide aid is part of these promises, 
                                                   
 
2 While the paper focuses specifically on the use of aid to influence multilateral negotiation processes, 
this does not mean to exclude other strategies that may be used by parties to influence a negotiation, 
such as the provision of expert information, offering other kinds of material promises and threats, use 
of blaming and shaming, bundling of issues into package deals to allow for logrolling, forming 
coalitions, gaining support from non-state actors, etc.   
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and the announcement to withdraw aid is part of the threats. However, this part of the 
literature does not focus specifically on the role of aid, and discussions generally remain at the 
level of a comparison of different types of negotiation tactics and strategies and an analysis of 
the reasons behind the choice of negotiation tactics and strategies. Most of this literature is 
case study-based and qualitative in nature. Some recent examples include Elms (2006) on the 
use of bargaining strategies in bilateral trade negotiations; Narlikar and Odell (2006) on 
multilateral trade negotiations; Dür and Mateo (2010), Schneider (2009) and McKibben 
(2013) on EU negotiations; Wagner (1999), Underdal (2011), and Bailer (2012) on 
environmental negotiations. The last two studies are among those rare examples that attempt 
to use a large-N quantitative approach to the study of negotiation strategies. 
The promise to provide aid in exchange of support in a multilateral negotiation can also be 
considered as an example of issue-linkage. Issue-linkage is usually characterized as a way to 
enhance the chances of cooperation by allowing parties to change the structure of payoffs in 
the negotiation game, e.g., by expanding the opportunities to punish non-cooperation (Oye 
1985; Barrett 1997). 3 Alternatively, aid provision—particularly aid for purposes that are 
specific to the issues under negotiation—can be regarded as a side-payment or transfer that is 
also usually introduced in multilateral agreements as a way to reduce heterogeneity across 
parties and thus encourage broader participation (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Chen 1997). 
Issue-linkage and side payments are useful strategies in long-term negotiation processes that 
are best characterized as repeated games (Axelrod 1984; Oye 1985; Wagner 2001).  
The relevant negotiations and game-theoretic literature also examines the contribution of 
these (and other) bargaining strategies to the overall outcome of the negotiations—the 
likelihood to achieve full cooperation—and to compliance and enforcement problems (see, in 
addition to the above, Hopmann 1995; Wagner 1999; Underdal 2011). However, the literature 
has so far not fully addressed the question of how effective they are in influencing individual 
partner countries’ negotiation behavior towards preference alignment with a donor within a 
multilateral setting. Existing research rather looks generally at which forms of bargaining may 
be conducive to drawing other negotiators on one’s side (Sebenius 1992; Money 1998; 
Wagner 1999). In addition, Weiler (2012) looks at how the choice of negotiation strategies 
affects parties’ individual success at the negotiations. 
                                                   
 
3 A common example of issue linkage cited in the literature is the introduction of trade sanctions as a 
way to encourage compliance with multilateral environmental agreements.  
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In contrast, the literature on UN voting explicitly focuses on the use of development aid in 
multilateral decision-making. This literature is vast, with first publications already in the 
1960s (see, e.g., Keohane 1966). Rai (1980) summarizes and updates this early literature. He 
clearly delineates the possible causal channels, namely the use of aid as a means to either 
incentivize (ex ante), or to reward or punish (ex post) voting alignment (or the lack thereof) 
with the donor at the General Assembly. In the 1990s, the general effect of aid on UNGA 
voting is rejected based on econometric analysis (Sexton and Decker 1992), but reconfirmed 
for “important votes”, i.e. votes on topics of actual relevance to the donor (Wang 1999). 
Simultaneously, several authors explore the reversely causal channel of voting alignment 
leading to more aid. Thacker (1999), for instance, finds that UN voting alignment with the 
United States, the most powerful member of the IMF, increases a country's probability of 
receiving an IMF loan. Towards the end of the 1990s the strategic use of aid in the context of 
UN voting was already a well-established result. 
Nevertheless the field has grown ever more quickly in the 2000s, with authors further trying 
to disentangle reward and punishment from inducement (Derouen and Heo 2004), and 
examining the UNSC and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights rather than just 
UNGA voting (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher and Vreeland 2009; Lebovic and Voeten 
2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012; Hwang, Sanford and Lee 2015). Recent studies 
also increasingly look beyond the US at a broader set of donor countries (Pincin 2012; Lim 
and Vreeland 2013; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2016), and at the influence that such 
donors may exert on multilateral agencies (like the IMF, the World Bank and regional 
development banks) to mobilize their funding for vote buying purposes (Barro and Lee 2005; 
Kilby 2006; Reynaud and Vauday 2009; Dreher, Vreeland and Sturm 2012). In addition, 
some studies differentiate between different types of aid that are more or less conducive to 
strategic use in the context of UN vote buying (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008; Kilby 
2013a, 2013b; Kersting and Kilby 2016). Conceptually, there has also been a discussion on 
how to disentangle the effect of vote alignment when preferences are aligned anyway, from 
the effect of alignment when initial preferences are truly opposing (Andersen, Harr and Tarp 
2006; Kilby 2011; Carter and Stone 2015). Finally, some studies consider the effect of this 
type of strategic aid on development outcomes (Stone 2004; Dreher, Eichenauer and Gehring 
2014; Dreher and Kilby 2010).  
In a few cases authors also look at voting outside the UN, e.g., at the International Whaling 
Commission (Miller and Dolšak 2008; Strand and Tuman 2012). However, we are not aware 
6 	
of any study that extends the analysis to the wider field of international negotiations, outside 
the sphere of formal voting. It appears highly plausible that aid is used strategically there as 
well. However, there are several caveats to consider:   
First, making statements within an international negotiation process is conceptually different 
from voting. It allows for a more nuanced expression of preferences than just a yes- or a no-
vote. Moreover, even if a country is in clear agreement or disagreement with another party’s 
statement, it will not necessarily see any need to express this within the plenary. Such a lack 
of expression is different from an abstention in a vote (Ehlermann and Ehring 2005, 67). The 
country in question may simply rely on others to make the relevant point or feel that it has not 
(yet) sufficiently familiarized itself with the specific topic under discussion to form a clear 
opinion. It may also use diplomatic language in a way that is identifiable as disagreement 
only by those directly involved, or it may support a position not because it is convinced by its 
actual content, but because it believes that such support will delay the negotiation process. 
Second, statements within international negotiation processes usually have no immediate 
effect on the overall outcome of the negotiation process. Statements can be used strategically 
to obtain a better starting position in the following round of negotiations (e.g., by initially 
exaggerating ones’ demands or positions), and they can be revised at any time.4 For this 
reason, swaying such statements—which would be considered ‘cheap talk’ or ‘bluffing’—
may not appear important enough to donors to attempt any influence through aid within 
international negotiations. From this perspective, statements in negotiation processes could 
resemble the votes qualified as “unimportant” in the UN voting literature and, just as the 
latter, not show any significant relationship to development aid. 
Third, other than at the UN, negotiators from industrialized countries typically represent their 
country only in a very specific thematic area and within an ex-ante defined mandate, and their 
authority may not go beyond that (Skovgaard and Gallant 2015; see also Groen and Niemann 
2010 for the specific case of the EU delegation to the UNFCCC). For industrialized country 
negotiators this implies that they may not have a handle on overall aid and can commit 
funding only in their specific field. Similarly, negotiators from developing countries may not 
                                                   
 
4 For a study analyzing such strategically adopted extreme positions, see Schneider and Cederman 
1994. A broader discussion on the difference between actors’ preferences and their strategically 
adopted positions can be found in Frieden 1999 and Morrow 1999. On the dynamics of making and 
withdrawing proposals in the climate change negotiations, see Yamin and Depledge 2004, 440. 
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be overly interested in general development aid, but prefer funding over which they will have 
more direct authority. The distinction between different types of aid that could be relevant as 
a strategic tool hence appears even more important in the context of international negotiations 
than in the context of UN voting. 
In sum, the expected mechanisms relating aid and negotiation support may not be fully 
identical to those discussed in the above cited literature, and it is not a priori clear, to what 
extent we will find a relationship between aid and negotiation support at all. In the following 
section, we will clarify the possible mechanisms and illustrate them with some of the ample 
anecdotal evidence and suggestive statements by negotiators from the UNFCCC.  
 
3. Conceptual framework 
If statements in the framework of international negotiations are generally not binding, and 
usually do not directly lead to any outcome, why would anyone care about support or 
criticism in this context at all? The following arguments may be relevant in this context: 
First, media often intensively report about international negotiations. In addition, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), business lobbies and other interest groups closely 
observe the negotiation process (Betzold 2013; Böhmelt et al. 2014). At the UNFCCC, these 
groups directly attend most of the meetings. Under such conditions, whatever is said does not 
remain behind closed doors. We thus expect support or opposition by other parties to affect 
the reputation of the national delegation or even of the government as a whole through 
information that spreads to peers outside the negotiation process and to the domestic public. 
Most countries prefer to be seen as ‘deal makers’ rather than as obstructive laggards or ‘deal 
breakers’. Criticism is hence perceived as ‘shaming and blaming’ while praise is perceived as 
a sign of successful international diplomacy.  
Conrad’s discussion of the Chinese problem with the international media blaming the country 
for the failure of the UNFCCC’s summit in Copenhagen represents an illustrative example:  
“China’s negotiating style during the final hours of Copenhagen has captivated media 
observers around the world […]. The state of negotiations posed an imminent risk of Premier 
Wen Jiabao being associated with a political failure. [… Eventually] the team around Wen 
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Jiabao was primarily concerned with limiting the damage and insulating the Prime Minister 
from the foreseeable failure of the summit.” (Conrad 2012, 444). 
Second, changing positions, unless well explained, can appear inconsistent and be considered 
as a sign for incompetence, weakness or opportunism. A frequent and/or drastic change will 
be caught by the media, which may imply reputational cost for the delegation at least with 
respect to particular audiences.  
Third, while they are non-binding, statements given at any time of the negotiations pave the 
way for the (dis)agreement on which the negotiations will end: Initial support for any 
proposition in the negotiations can lead to social pressure on other parties to follow suit. Thus, 
achieving support at any point within the negotiations leads to path dependencies that increase 
the chance of an agreement on this point in the future. Similar dynamics can occur in the 
context of initial criticism: Criticism by one country may trigger criticism by others. These 
dynamics make each individual statement more relevant than it may appear at first glance. 
Finally, under the type of consensus-based decision-making procedure that is typical of the 
UNFCCC and many other arenas of international negotiation, any individual party has a de 
facto veto power over any decision (Steinberg 2002; Yamin and Depledge 2004, 443; 
Ehlermann and Ehring 2005, 65).5 It therefore becomes essential to convince all parties to 
support an emerging consensus. Hence convincing each individual country becomes very 
important—more important than in UNGA voting where a few opposing views cannot block 
the decisions. This in turn suggests that donors may resort to all means at their disposition—
including threats and promises related to aid—to convince recipient countries to support their 
positions. 
On the basis of these arguments, we expect parties to care about support and opposition in the 
negotiations. While the political benefits and costs may be less pronounced than if there had 
been a direct vote, we still expect them to be sufficiently pronounced to induce action by 
parties trying to obtain the former, and to avoid the latter. Development aid can be a useful 
tool in this respect. 
                                                   
 
5 Note that there are a few exceptions to this rule as “consensus” does not necessarily require 
unanimity, but just a general sense that the parties in the room will not challenge the decision—which 
has at times been interpreted in a rather peculiar way in international negotiations, as discussed by 
Michaelowa, Michaelowa and Bagchi (2016). 
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Development aid may be related to support or opposition in the negotiations in different ways. 
On the one hand, aid can generally elicit support for the donor by fostering mutual 
understanding and trust through the experience of fruitful collaboration. This collaboration 
and exchange may lead to the natural development of common principles and ideas, so that 
positions become more aligned. This can generate ties between certain donors and recipients, 
especially in the long run. We do not consider this as a strategic use of aid because the 
alignment of preferences and the potentially resulting support in the climate negotiations are 
then more of a by-product than the central objective of the engagement in aid. As expressed 
by Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Wood (2014, 90), who discuss the use of aid in this specific 
context: “By doing good, a country can do well”. In other words, aid allows the donor to 
increase its soft power, but this need not even be intentional, particularly not in the context of 
a rather specific issue-area such as climate change. 
On the other hand, aid can be used strategically to buy support in the negotiations. This 
support buying can happen individually (vote buying by individual donors), as illustrated by 
the following example of Japan prior to the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol:  
“In Japan, ministers are distributing funds with an eye on diplomatic aims. The government’s 
Cool Earth Partnership, announced last year, includes US$10 billion for climate projects in 
developing countries. After interviewing government officials, Friends of the Earth Japan 
concluded that the scheme was designed in part to buy support for Japan’s position at Kyoto 
protocol negotiations, where the country is pushing for India and China to do more to limit 
emissions. Ministers are currently considering partnership projects in some of the world’s 
poorest nations, such as Burkina Faso and Bangladesh.”6  
However, votes might also be bought by the group of developed countries as a whole, e.g., 
when mechanisms for the financing of poor countries are directly built into the text of the 
agreement under discussion in order to elicit their overall consent, and to make them swallow 
those parts of the agreement they would otherwise oppose. 7  For instance, when parties 
suggested the “Copenhagen Accord” as a minimalistic substitute for the much broader 
agreement initially intended, the promise of 100 billion USD/year in climate finance figured 
in the document. In this context, some vulnerable developing country delegates explicitly 
                                                   
 
6 New Scientist, 13 January 2009 (https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16406-comment-climate-
aid-is-tantamount-to-bribery/). 
7 For the theory on such broad transfers, see Carraro and Siniscalco 1993 and Chen 1997. 
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voiced the allegation of a bribe that industrialized countries were using to obtain consensus on 
an inacceptable document, simply to mask their failure. Dimitrov reports a number of related 
statements, notably the following statement by the Sudanese ambassador:  
“[The Copenhagen Accord] is murderous. It condemns and turns Africa into a furnace 
because 2 degrees Celsius results in 3.5 degrees [temperature rise in Africa] according to 
IPCC. [...] The promise of 100 billion US dollars would not bribe us to destroy the 
continent.” (Dimitrov 2010, 811)  
The quote of the Cuban delegation at the beginning of this paper is taken from the same 
context.  
While these examples suggest that aid is provided (or at least promised) ex ante, other 
accounts suggest that aid may also be provided ex post as a reward or be withdrawn as a 
punishment. This follows the tit-for-tat or reciprocating strategy suggested by Axelrod (1984) 
as a way to encourage cooperation in repeated negotiations, and is also in line with UN voting 
literature where evidence has been found for both. While this suggests that there may be a 
reverse causality issue (does aid cause support, or does support cause aid?), we believe that 
the distinction is not substantially meaningful here. Firstly, as in the tit-for-tat game, these 
multilateral negotiations typically consist of several rounds that stretch over many days, 
allowing for reciprocating strategies: today’s reward for yesterday’s support in turn 
constitutes an incentive for further support tomorrow. In addition, an ex-post reward or 
punishment may well be anticipated, which is then substantively equivalent to an initial 
promise. Aid commitments are not much more than promises anyway, since subsequent 
disbursements cannot be fully taken for granted. The same argument can be made for threats 
of withdrawal. The media reported some anecdotal evidence related to such threats:  
“The US State Department is denying climate change assistance to countries opposing the 
Copenhagen accord”8  
“It was made very clear by the EU, UK, France and the US that if they did not back them then 
they would suffer.”9  
                                                   
 
8 The Guardian, 9 April 2010 (http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/apr/09/us-climate-aid). 
9 African diplomat, cited by The Guardian, 11 April 2010 
(http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/apr/11/climate-aid-threats-copenhagen-accord). 
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This clearly suggests a strategic use of development aid to obtain support. As far as possible, 
we will attempt to empirically disentangle this strategic use of aid for support in the climate 
negotiations, from the less strategic use discussed initially, when a better understanding is 
simply the natural by-product of increased aid. Along with multiple fixed effects and a 
somewhat indirect interpretation of a standard instrumental variable approach (see Section 4), 
we will distinguish between several types of aid that may be conceptually different in this 
respect.  
General aid, i.e. Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a whole, can a priori be used in 
both ways. It is the basis of bilateral cooperation between donor and recipient governments, 
and can generate long-term partnerships between countries. As argued above, while such 
partnerships can be beneficial in a concrete negotiation context, they are not built up with this 
specific objective, and the related funding can hence not be considered as strategic for support 
in these negotiations. However, as highlighted in the UN voting literature, general ODA can 
also be used as an incentive, threat or reward, and in principle, this is also true for the specific 
context of the climate negotiations. To the extent that ODA is valuable to the recipient, its 
promise represents the famous ‘carrot’, and the threat of its withdrawal the corresponding 
‘stick’.  
Yet, the negotiators on both sides are different from the diplomats that represent their 
countries in the UN General Assembly or the UNSC. In the climate negotiations, the typical 
negotiator is a specialized staff from an environmental agency or ministry, and even if the 
heads of state are frequently flown in at the end of the negotiations for the final speech, the 
more specialized staff is de facto responsible to negotiate the deal (Skovgaard and Gallant 
2015). As mentioned above, these negotiators may not have the authority over general ODA. 
On the donor side, they would need to enter complex negotiations with other parts of their 
own government in order to induce a change in overall aid. More easily, they can promise 
specific climate finance, which falls in their area of responsibility. On the recipient side, there 
may also be a greater demand for climate-specific funding, because other funding will be 
channeled into government budgets that are not under the control of the agencies represented 
in the negotiations. Assuming that recipients’ delegates have a strong interest in the size of 
their own budget, which affects their standing within the domestic government, they will 
hence prefer specific climate funding to general ODA. In such a setting, we should expect 
climate finance rather than development aid in general, to be used for strategic purposes 
within the UNFCCC negotiations.  
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Within climate finance, we can further distinguish between two aid-related categories, namely 
aid for the adaptation to, and aid for the mitigation of global climate change (‘adaptation aid’ 
and ‘mitigation aid’). If developing country negotiators do not only care about boosting their 
budget, adaptation aid should be preferable to them. This is because adaptation directly 
addresses the needs of their domestic population in terms of preventing the local effects of 
droughts, floods, heat waves or other climate-related events. In contrast, mitigation addresses 
a global public good: the reduction of emissions that will eventually lead to less warming 
across the world. Since the benefits from global public goods are globally non-excludable by 
definition, there is no particular local benefit of a mitigation activity implemented locally as 
compared to the same activity implemented elsewhere. In reality, the line cannot be drawn so 
sharply because most mitigation projects also bring about some local co-benefits such as 
infrastructural development or job creation, but for a given amount of aid, the directly locally 
relevant effect will still be higher for adaptation aid than for mitigation aid. 
This leads us to formulate a set of nested hypotheses, from broad to specific: 
H1: Aid is used to buy support (or avoid opposition) in the negotiations. 
H2: Climate aid, rather than general aid, is used to buy support (or avoid opposition) 
in the negotiations. 
H3: Adaptation aid, rather than mitigation aid, is used to buy support (or avoid 
opposition) in the negotiations. 
4. Data and empirical methods  
4.1. Data  
Our dataset consists of a three-dimensional panel with dyadic information for donor-recipient 
pairs over the years 2002-2013. While we coded negotiation-related data since 1995, the time 
series is restricted by the availability of reliable data on climate aid. Donors considered are the 
traditional members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as far as they 
correspond to parties to the UNFCCC. Since EU donors typically speak with one voice in the 
climate negotiations, they are considered as a single donor here. Information referring to the 
EU is correspondingly aggregated across all EU members. Overall the dataset hence includes 
the following ten donors: Australia, Canada, the EU, Iceland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, 
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Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Similarly, all 149 DAC aid recipients are 
included that have simultaneously been parties to the UNFCCC.  
The dependent variable is obtained from a new dataset describing negotiation behavior under 
the UNFCCC (Castro 2017). The data covers all regular meetings of the UNFCCC bodies 
across the different areas under discussion. Coding is based on the summaries of these 
negotiation meetings as published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD) in its Earth Negotiations Bulletins (ENBs) (IISD 2000-2013). Each issue of the ENB 
records a full day of negotiations covering discussions on all the items and topics on the 
agenda for that day. Using the ENBs for coding negotiation behavior has several advantages 
but also some limitations. The main advantage is the availability of a long time series of 
consistent data. Despite not being full transcripts, the ENBs are the most complete and regular 
reports of the climate change negotiations, and are written by trained reporters in an objective 
way and with a consistent language over the years. In addition, there is an effort to keep them 
neutral and independent from any political side. However, they present just summarized 
versions of the discussions, and it is very difficult to ascertain what is not reported. Specific 
statements are attributed to countries only for those negotiation meetings that are open to 
observers. Whenever the ENBs cover closed meetings, the statements are not attributed to 
particular parties. The dataset thus excludes most informal meetings in which very 
controversial or very detailed issues are discussed. Despite this, we expect that open 
meetings—in which those informal discussions are frequently reviewed and recapitulated—
will still reflect the main patterns of support and opposition between donors and recipients.   
The dataset codes how countries interact with each other in the negotiations as reported by the 
ENBs. We thereby distinguish between supportive statements (speaking on behalf of, 
supporting, or agreeing with one another) on the one hand and opposing statements (delaying, 
opposing or criticizing others’ positions or statements) on the other. For example, volume 12, 
issue 493 of the ENB, from 6th December 2010, reports: “VIETNAM, PERU and BENIN 
stressed that the Kyoto Protocol is the cornerstone of the regime to address climate change. 
[…] JAPAN said since not all major emitters are part of the Kyoto Protocol, a second 
commitment period is neither fair nor effective.” This unit of text is coded as an agreement 
between Vietnam, Peru and Benin (with separate observations for each of the possible dyads), 
and as opposition by Japan against these three countries. Further coding examples can be 
found in the Online Appendix A, which includes a summary of the data’s codebook. 
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This coding scheme is applied to all negotiations during the period of analysis, so that we 
have a variable recording all instances in which each country expresses support or opposition 
towards any of the other countries participating in the discussions. In our context, we are 
interested only in recipients’ reactions to donor statements, so that we drop observations on 
exchanges among donors or among recipients alone, as well as donors’ reactions to recipients. 
Overall, we find a total of 3158 statements in which recipients criticize or support any donor 
over the years 2002-2013. Descriptive statistics of this data are available in Online Appendix 
A, including the evolution of support and opposition over time (Figure A1), sub-categories of 
statements, and rankings of the most active recipients (Tables A1-A4). 10  The most 
straightforward way to compute measures for support (‘Supportive statements’) and 
opposition (‘Critical statements’) is then simply to add up the respective number of 
statements by each recipient with respect to each donor across the different negotiation 
meetings in any given year.  
This simple aggregation of supportive and opposing statements hides a more nuanced range 
of relationships reflected in the sub-categories mentioned in brackets above. Within the 
supportive statements, we have at one extreme the case of countries actively coordinating 
their positions so that one of them is able to ‘speak on behalf’ of the others; then the case of 
countries directly expressing ‘support’ for one of their peers; and finally the cases in which 
countries simply ‘agree’ with what someone else already said. Within the opposing 
statements, one extreme is the case in which a country openly ‘criticizes’ another’s positions, 
actions or statements, followed by a country simply expressing an ‘opposing’ position, and 
finally a country seeking to ‘delay’ the discussion of someone else’s proposal. 
If countries consider the reputational costs and benefits of support and opposition in the 
negotiations, the above-mentioned differences in the sub-categories should be relevant to 
them. Open criticism, for instance, will much more easily attract the attention of the media 
than a mild statement of disagreement. In our preferred measure, we hence weight the 
different sub-categories before building the sum. In addition, we integrate supportive and 
opposing statements in a single indicator for all statements, by subtracting the weighted sum 
of the latter from the sum of the former. This leads to a ‘Support index’, which takes into 
                                                   
 
10 The negotiations encompass interactions not only between individual countries, but also between 
country groups or coalitions such as the group of Least Developed Countries, the African Group, the 
EU or the G77. For this analysis, we exclude all observations in which such coalitions speak, except 
for the case of the EU as a donor.  
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account both the frequency and the degree of the support and ranges from -18 (strong and 
frequent opposition) to 20 (strong and frequent support): 
Support indexijt = 3·speaking on behalfijt + 3·supportijt + 2·agreementijt  
–1·delayijt – 2·oppositionijt – 3·criticismijt,    (1) 
whereby each of the variables speaking on behalfijt etc. measures the frequency of the 
respective type of statement for each donor i, recipient j, and year t. 
As an example: In 2010, China opposed the EU eight times, but also agreed with the EU once. 
The Support index for this particular year and dyad is hence coded as: 
Support indexEU, China, 2010 =3·0 + 3·0 + 2·1 – 1·0 – 2·8 – 3·0 = –14 
To ensure that our findings are robust to the weights described above, we also build a non-
weighted overall measure of support and criticism, which ranges from -9 (frequent 
opposition) to 10 (frequent support): 
Unweighted support indexijt = speaking on behalfijt + supportijt + agreementijt  
        – delayijt – oppositionijt – criticismijt   (2) 
In order to put these values into perspective, we also code how many times each country 
(donor or recipient) is reported by the ENBs to speak in each year (‘Interventions donor’ and 
‘Interventions recipient’), even when this participation does not entail supporting or 
criticizing another party. This is to be able to control for the fact that some countries simply 
participate in the debate more often than others do, which may be related to the size of their 
delegation, the delegates’ language proficiency and the like. As an alternative measure of 
donors’ and recipients’ level of activity in the negotiations, we also count the total number of 
(supportive and opposing) interactions for each dyad and year (‘Dyadic interventions’). 
The explanatory variables are bilateral ODA commitments (in millions of constant 2014 
USD) for each donor-recipient dyad and year as reported by OECD (2016). We use total 
commitments as well as commitments based on the so-called ‘Rio markers’ that separately 
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identify mitigation and adaptation aid.11 Data verified by the DAC and hence more reliable 
than earlier data12 is available for mitigation aid since 2002, and for adaptation aid since 2010.  
To reduce the effect of outliers, both the dependent variables and the aid variables are used in 
natural logarithms. To avoid the creation of missing values for values smaller or equal to zero 
we first rescale the numbers by adding a constant. To allow for a more flexible functional 
form, we further introduce square terms for all variables reflecting the level of negotiation 
activity by recipients, donors or dyads. For details on these transformations, see Online 
Appendix A, Table A5. 
In addition to these main variables, we use a number of controls, such as the ‘Trade 
relationship’ between the donor and the recipient (UN Comtrade 2016), the absolute 
difference between the donor’s and the recipient’s level of democracy (‘Democracy’) (Quality 
of Government Institute 2016),13 Voeten’s (2013) voting similarity index, i.e., the share of 
aligned UN votes between donor and recipient (‘UN alignment’), recipients’ vulnerability to 
climate change (‘Vulnerability’) as measured by the ND-GAIN vulnerability index, (ND-ECI 
2015) and the natural logarithm of the recipients’ ‘GDP per capita’, PPP (constant 2011 
international $) (World Bank 2016). All variable definitions and basic descriptive statistics 
are presented in the Online Appendix A, Table A5. In complementary models used to check 
the robustness of our results we include further variables such as foreign direct investment 
flows between the two countries in each dyad, as well as separate measures for exports and 
imports instead of the Trade relationship variable.  
4.2. Methodological approach  
Since the data are in the form of a three-dimensional panel, we have the possibility to use 
dyad fixed effects as well as year fixed effects. This controls for all time invariant donor and 
recipient characteristics as well as for characteristics that vary only over time and not across 
dyads. The year fixed effects capture the influence of individual years such as, for instance, 
                                                   
 
11 The Rio markers include two types of variables, depending on whether adaptation or mitigation are 
the main objective of the respective aid activity (‘Adaptation principal’, ‘Mitigation principal’) or 
only one relevant objective among others (‘Adaptation significant’, ‘Mitigation significant’). For this 
analysis, we created aggregate measures of total adaptation and total mitigation aid.  
12 Generally, the reliability of these data has been questioned quite severely (see Roberts et al. 2008, 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011, and Weikmans et al. 2017). However, there is some evidence that 
the current data available online is more reliable (Bagchi, Castro and Michaelowa, 2016). 
13 Based on the Freedom House (2015) civil liberties and political rights scores, obtained from the 
Quality of Government dataset 2016.  
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the year 2009 with the Copenhagen summit, but also general trends over time. The dyad fixed 
effects capture the influence of all unobservable or otherwise omitted variables that are 
specific to the donor and/or the recipient. The latter substantially reduce the potential sources 
of endogeneity. Dyad fixed effects notably control for long-term relationships between a 
donor and a recipient, based, e.g., on common culture and language, or on prior development 
cooperation. If aid is positively significant in this type of model, the effect cannot be 
explained by the natural alignment of preferences between long-term development partners, 
and therefore suggests that aid is used strategically. To control for unobserved time-variant 
country characteristics (Bai 2009, 1232) in our robustness tests we further include (i) the 
interaction of recipient and year fixed effects, and (ii) the interaction of donor and year fixed 
effects. This can capture differing reactions to period-specific shocks (such as the 
Copenhagen failure) or to more gradual shifts over time (such as the phasing in of new 
negotiation topics that may influence existing alliances). More generally, we will show how 
the results change with the inclusion of different types of fixed effects. 
Another way to explore whether aid is truly used strategically or whether recipients simply 
react to any aid with a sympathetic orientation towards the donor, is to run a placebo two-
staged least squares (2SLS) model with an instrument that ensures that variation in aid is 
exogenous to the international climate negotiations. We follow Jackson’s idea to instrument 
aid with a variable whose exogenous variation is taken from disasters striking other recipients 
of the same donor (Jackson 2014). The idea is simple: Assuming that a donor’s overall aid 
budget is fixed for any given year, if a major disaster happens somewhere in the world, 
funding will be reallocated to this region and away from other countries. This generates an 
exogenously driven reduction of aid for these other countries. As the amount of funding that 
is reallocated depends on the importance of the country hit by the disaster in the donor’s 
overall aid budget, disasters are weighted by this country’s share in the donor’s aid budget 
during the previous ten years. We follow Jackson in using data from the Emergency Events 
Database (EM-DAT) (CRED 2015). From this database we draw information on the number 
of people affected by disasters (in thousands). On this basis, the instrumental variable can be 
defined as: !"#$% = '#(%( ∙ (+,-+.,	011,23,4)(%       (3) 
With  6 ∈ 1,2, … , < − 1, < + 1,… ?  , i.e., including all recipients except j, and  
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'#(% = @ABCDEFGHEIFGHJ @ABCEFGHEIFGHJ , the weight of recipient k in donor i’s aid budget. 
In our specific context, however, some doubts with respect to the exogeneity of this variable 
may remain. Since we analyze the international climate negotiations, disasters linked to 
climatological and meteorological extreme events may have a direct effect on the 
negotiations. Hence, the exclusion restriction could be violated. In addition, if a neighboring 
country is hit by crisis, this experience may lead to a change in one’s negotiation strategy that 
could be spuriously related to a change in aid. 
To avoid these potentially remaining sources of endogeneity, we adjust the instrument by 
taking into account only biological, geophysical and complex14 disasters, and by excluding 
not only the recipient itself, but also all neighboring recipients. The coding of neighbors is 
based on Neumayer's contiguity measure (Neumayer 2011). According to this measure, 
countries are considered as contiguous if they either share a border, or if they are separated by 
less than 150 km across an ocean. On this basis we construct our adjusted instrumental 
variable: !"2#$% = '#(%( ∙ (+,-+.,	011,23,4	KL	KM-. , O,-+ℎLQ. -R	2-S+.,T	4MQ0Q3,RQ)(% (4) 
with 6 ∈ ~V. The set ~N contains all recipients except j or any of its neighbors. 
In the regressions, we will use the natural logarithm of these variables (previously adding +1 
to avoid the generation of missing values). In this form, the instruments should better match 
the original aid variables, which are equally logged. Given that different types of aid (general, 
adaptation or mitigation aid) may be correlated more or less strongly with instruments based 
on the different disasters, we calculate the first stage for each type of aid with each type of 
disasters and then select the IV with the highest Kleibergen-Paap F statistic for the final 
model.  
We also assess whether the postulated strategic use of aid and the related negotiation behavior 
of the recipients can always be observed immediately, i.e., within a given year, as we expect 
given the fast pace and constantly evolving nature of the negotiations. We therefore run 
further placebo regressions using 1- and 2-year lags and 1-year leads of the aid variables.  
                                                   
 
14 In the EM-DAT dataset, complex disasters are defined as famines whose main cause is not a 
drought. Other types of non-climatological and non-meteorological disasters were also tested, but they 
proved to be too weakly correlated with aid to be useful instruments. 
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To provide information on whether it is primarily the amount of aid received or just the mere 
possibility to receive aid at all that influences recipients’ support for donors at the 
negotiations, we further run separate models with a dummy for any positive aid flow 
(‘Dummy (Aid)’) on the one hand, and other regressions restricted to dyads with positive aid 
flows.  
A separate methodological consideration needs to be given to the case of the alternative 
dependent variables ln(Supportive statements) and ln(Critical statements). Looking at them 
separately might be relevant since it could be that support and criticism are influenced by aid 
in different ways. The two variables are left-censored as less than zero statements cannot be 
made. This suggests the use of a Tobit model. However, dyad fixed effects are not compatible 
with this approach because their consistent estimation requires a large number of periods, 
while we only have 5 years for adaptation aid and 11 years for mitigation aid. We hence apply 
a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) model, which allows us to address the left-
censoring at zero while providing more flexibility in terms of adding fixed effects.15  
Given the three-dimensional nature of the panel dataset, special care also needs to be given to 
clustering. It is clearly insufficient to cluster at the recipient-donor dyad level, as this would 
imply that any observations for the same donor but different recipients or for the same 
recipient but different donors should be uncorrelated. For a sufficiently large sample across all 
dimensions, multi-way clustering would be ideal, as suggested by Cameron, Gelbach and 
Miller (2011). However, given that we only have ten donors in our sample, multi-way (as 
well as simple donor-level) clustering does not lead to a consistent estimation of the variance-
covariance matrix. For our main specifications we therefore use clusters at the recipient level. 
In robustness checks we also run the regressions with multi-way clustering at the recipient 
and donor levels despite the above mentioned methodological concerns.16  
5. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents our basic results based on panel regressions with dyad and year fixed effects. 
Equations 1-3 use all available observations for the different aid variables while Equations 4-
5 use the limited sample available for adaptation aid for total aid and mitigation aid as well. 
                                                   
 
15 While PPML has been more frequently used to estimate gravity models in international trade, some 
recent applications can be found in the aid allocation literature, too (see Dreher, Gehring, and Klasen 
2015).  
16 The panel and IV regressions using clustering are implemented with the user-written command 
reghdfe in Stata (Correia 2017). 
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While this leads to slightly changed coefficient estimates, the substantive outcomes are 
identical: Total ODA does not affect the statements made in favor or against a donor country. 
For adaptation and mitigation aid, however, we do find evidence for a positive relationship. 
However, the size of the coefficients appears surprisingly small, indicating that a 1% increase 
in aid leads to an increase of only about 0.003% on our Support index. This small elasticity of 
support has to be put in perspective, however, with the huge relative change in climate aid we 
often observe from one year to the other. This is partly driven (somewhat artificially) by the 
fact that the majority of countries do not receive any mitigation or adaptation aid at all during 
most of time.17 Hence donors may easily multiply initial climate aid a thousand times and 
more if they want to use it as a bargaining tool.  
These results lend support to H1 that aid is used to buy support and/or avoid opposition in the 
negotiations. Given that the aid variables are not lagged and that the panel regressions are 
based on annual data, the outcomes reflect a short-term relationship, not an effect of aid that 
could build up over time and generate a natural alignment between donor and recipient. Time-
invariant general characteristics of donor and recipient that could lead to their positional 
closeness and simultaneously to intensive development cooperation are controlled for through 
the dyad fixed effects and cannot bias the coefficient estimates.  
The results are equally consistent with H2 that posits that climate-change related aid, rather 
than general ODA, should be used for this purpose. However, we do not find any evidence for 
a greater effect of adaptation aid as compared to mitigation aid (H3). In contrast, mitigation 
aid has a similar effect—or even a substantially greater effect when looking at Equation 5 for 
which the sample is reduced to the same period for which information on adaptation aid is 
available. It seems that the co-benefits of development projects in the area of mitigation have 
been attractive enough to make this type of aid interesting for recipients. There may also be 
some lobbying by domestic private entrepreneurs who want to implement mitigation projects. 
In addition, awareness of adaptation as a climate-related aid category has only emerged in 
very recent years. Given that adaptation is closely related to the resilience of the local 
population and infrastructure—its ability to react to shocks such as heat waves, droughts or 
floods—it is often difficult to disentangle it from more general development aid (Buchner et 
                                                   
 
17 Driven by the many zeroes to start with, the median increase in mitigation and adaptation aid 
(excluding all dyads during which aid simply remains at zero) is 25’200’000% and 10’696’550% 
respectively. The median reduction in the sample is more modest, with values of -100% for both types 
of climate aid (we do not have the problem of zero-starting values here). 
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al. 2011, 30; Pickering et al. 2015, 151). Finally, budgets for mitigation aid are substantively 
larger than those for adaptation aid (see the descriptive statistics in Table A5, Online 
Appendix A). In any case, H3 is clearly rejected by the available evidence.  
Table 1: Buying support at the UNFCCC 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
            
ln(Aid) 0.0001 0.0026** 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0042*** 
 (0.62) (0.03) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient -0.0001 0.0030*** -0.0006 0.0035*** 0.0026*** 
 (0.92) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.01) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.24) (0.46) (0.20) (0.50) (0.42) 
Interventions donor2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.73) (0.56) (0.52) (0.78) (0.44) 
Trade relationship 0.0021 0.0050 0.0026 0.0043 0.0046 
 (0.59) (0.48) (0.56) (0.51) (0.49) 
Democracy -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0012 
 (0.82) (0.65) (0.87) (0.77) (0.68) 
UN voting 0.0192*** -0.0033 0.0157*** -0.0056 -0.0055 
 (0.00) (0.69) (0.01) (0.52) (0.50) 
Vulnerability 0.2445* 0.5252 0.2550* 0.5277 0.5440 
 (0.08) (0.25) (0.07) (0.24) (0.23) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0367** -0.0548 -0.0392** -0.0544 -0.0561 
 (0.03) (0.18) (0.02) (0.17) (0.17) 
      
Observations 15330 5110 15330 5110 5110 
Number of clusters 129 129 129 129 129 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.095 0.081 0.108 0.071 0.100 
Note: Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The coefficient estimates for the control variables are only partially significant. Apparently, 
the dyad fixed effects already capture most of the relevant effects. Notably in the regressions 
on adaptation aid most controls are insignificant. This may be related to the substantially 
smaller sample we have in this case (the same occurs when we take a comparable sample for 
general and mitigation aid). One frequently significant variable is Interventions recipient. 
Both recipients who often criticize and recipients who often voice agreement (i.e., the 
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recipients at both ends of the Support index scale) are doing so to some extent, just because 
they are generally very active.  
In addition, vote alignment in the UN General Assembly is positively significant in some 
regressions indicating that positional closeness and/or mutual understanding between nations 
is correlated across different policy areas. Furthermore, highly vulnerable countries tend to 
support the donors more strongly and to voice less opposition. This may be due to the fact 
that some Western countries, and notably the EU, have been seen as rather progressive actors 
during the last decade. Finally, recipients’ GDP per capita is negatively significant, 
suggesting that the greatest disagreement occurs between developed and emerging economies, 
which should primarily capture the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) 
that have built their own negotiation group and have become increasingly assertive over time 
during our period of observation.  
These results are robust to various modifications of the estimation model presented in 
Section B of the Online Appendix. Tables B1 to B3 show almost identical results based on 
regressions with the Unweighted support index, on parsimonious regressions that only include 
Interventions donor and Interventions recipient and their squares along with the dyad and 
year fixed effects, and on regressions that control for Dyadic interventions instead of 
Interventions donor and Interventions recipient, or for Exports and Imports instead of the 
overall dyadic Trade relationship. The only substantive difference in all these tests is that 
adaptation aid is no longer significant in the regressions controlling for Dyadic interventions 
while the coefficient for mitigation aid further increases. Table B4 shows the results for multi-
way clustering. As compared to Table 1 coefficients remain identical (as they should), and 
mitigation aid remains strongly significant. Only adaptation aid is no more significant at 
conventional levels. Generally, the effect of adaptation aid appears somewhat less robust than 
the effect of mitigation aid. 
Table 2 shows how the results react to changes in the type of fixed effects included in the 
regression. The first line replicates the results from Table 1 for comparison. As mentioned 
earlier, we expect the dyad fixed effects to be crucial to distinguish long-term commonalities 
or friendship between donor and recipient from the short-term strategic use of aid in the 
negotiations. If aid also affects negotiation support by building up long-term friendly 
relationships between donor and recipient, we should find stronger positive coefficients in 
regressions without the dyad fixed effects, and possibly a positively significant effect for 
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general aid as well. This is indeed the case: the coefficient of total ODA multiplies by 3 and 4 
and becomes significant in the regression using only year fixed effects and in the regression 
using a combination of year and donor fixed effects, at least for the full sample (Column 1). 
There is no increase, however, for the coefficients of mitigation and adaptation aid in these 
regressions. This suggests that overall aid may be effective by generally building friendship 
between countries, while adaptation and mitigation aid affect negotiation behavior of 
recipients only in the short run, i.e., through their strategic use in a given negotiation round. 
The last two rows of Table 2 further confirm the existence of such a short-term strategic 
relationship between climate aid and negotiation support. They include the strictest possible 
form of control for unobservables by including not only dyad fixed effects, but also 
countryXyear fixed effects in the regression models. As compared to our baseline 
specifications in Table 1, the coefficients and significance levels remain virtually unchanged.  
Table 2: Coefficients of aid by types of fixed effects included in the model 
Dependent variable: 
ln (Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid  
Adaptation 
aid  
Mitigation 
aid  
Total 
aid  
Mitigation 
aid  
Model includes: 
 
     
- Dyad & year FE  0.0001 0.0026** 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0042*** 
  (same as Table 1) (0.62) (0.03) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) 
- Donor & year FE 0.0004** 0.0025* 0.0028*** 0.0003 0.0036*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.32) (0.00) 
 - Recipient & year FE 0.0001 0.0020 0.0025*** -0.0001 0.0028*** 
 (0.30) (0.10) (0.01) (0.67) (0.01) 
- Year FE 0.0003** 0.0024* 0.0028*** 0.0003 0.0035*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.27) (0.00) 
- Dyad FE &interactive  0.0001 0.0026** 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0042*** 
  recipient x year FE (0.63) (0.03) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) 
- Dyad FE & interactive 0.0001 0.0026** 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0042*** 
  donor x year FE (0.66) (0.03) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) 
      
Observations 15330 5110 15330 5110 5110 
Note: Table shows results for the main explanatory variable ln(Aid) in separate regressions with 
different fixed effects. The effect of control variables (same set as in Table 1) is not reported.  
Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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At the same time, dyadic fixed effects and even their combination with country-specific 
trends as captured by the countryXyear fixed effects cannot exclude reverse causality. 
However, given our arguments above, excluding reverse causality would even be 
conceptually problematic because it would downward bias the two-directional correlation we 
want to estimate. In fact, rather than this type of endogeneity, there are certain forms of 
exogenous changes in aid that would be problematic if they were the drivers of the effects we 
showed in Tables 1 and 2. If the increase in support we find for increased climate aid was 
based on a pure random shock in aid unrelated to the negotiations, this would not reflect the 
strategic interaction underlying our support-buying hypothesis. So far, we cannot exclude that 
short-term random variations in aid that evoke some spontaneous gratitude drive the above-
described results. As explained in Section 4, we carry out an instrumental variable regression 
to clarify the issue. Our support-buying hypothesis requires the results based on the 
instrumental variable approach to be insignificant.  
Table 3 presents the results of the corresponding 2SLS procedure. As explained in Section 4, 
for each type of aid, we chose the instruments showing the highest correlation in the first 
stage. We thus use instruments based on geophysical disasters for total ODA (columns 1-2), 
instruments based on complex disasters for adaptation aid (columns 3-4), and instruments 
based on all natural disasters for mitigation aid (columns 5-6) (for the exact definition of 
instruments, see Online Appendix A, Table A5). We present the regressions with both the IV2 
and IV version of the instrument. In nearly all cases, the partial F statistics show a reasonable 
correlation between our instruments and the different aid variables. Only in case of mitigation 
aid, the correlation with (any type of) disasters is limited and the best we can achieve is a 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic of just above five for IVnatural (for the complete first-stage 
results, see Online Appendix, Table B5). We thus need to rely on the slightly less credible IV 
(rather than IV2) version of the instrument, which includes disasters that happened in the 
recipient countries’ neighbors.  
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Table 3: Exogenous variation in aid (2SLS estimation, second stage) 
In any case, none of the aid-related coefficients is positively significant any more. These 
results suggest that a fully exogenous increase in aid independent of the UNFCCC 
negotiations does not trigger any greater support or reduced criticism by the recipient. They 
hence lend further support to our hypothesis that the aid-related increase in support or 
decrease in criticism demonstrated earlier is indeed based on strategic interaction within the 
negotiations. 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables for Aid: Total aid Total aid Adaptation 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Instrumental variables: IV2geoph IVgeoph IV2complex IVcomplex IV2natural IVnatural 
        
ln(Aid) 0.0078 0.0030 -0.0043 -0.0062 0.0140 0.0036 
 (0.46) (0.66) (0.65) (0.54) (0.60) (0.81) 
Interventions recipient -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0043* 0.0047* -0.0023 -0.0007 
 (0.79) (0.83) (0.08) (0.08) (0.59) (0.78) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.84) (0.32) 
Interventions donor -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.55) (0.57) (0.30) (0.26) 
Interventions donor2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.60) (0.92) (0.92) (0.83) (0.57) (0.72) 
Trade relationship 0.0023 0.0024 0.0029 0.0023 0.0041 0.0026 
 (0.55) (0.51) (0.62) (0.69) (0.60) (0.63) 
Democracy 0.0014 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.65) (0.86) (0.96) (1.00) (0.93) (0.85) 
UN voting 0.0184*** 0.0192*** -0.0079 -0.0092 0.0046 0.0152 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.51) (0.45) (0.88) (0.39) 
Vulnerability 0.2570 0.2497* 0.5254 0.5397 0.2895 0.2626* 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.24) (0.24) (0.11) (0.10) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0346* -0.0363** -0.0504 -0.0511 -0.0470 -0.0403 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.23) (0.24) (0.16) (0.11) 
       
Observations 15330 15083 5110 5060 15330 15083 
Number of clusters 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Kleibergen-Paap F 27.220 47.740 8.333 7.145 2.688 5.583 
Cragg-Donald F 18.350 34.600 4.522 3.872 3.912 7.379 
Kleibergen-Paap LM. 23.250 36.880 7.865 6.857 2.656 5.077 
Note: Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
For the first stage regressions, see Online Appendix B, Table B5. 
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We proceed with a plausibility check of the contemporaneous nature of the strategic 
interaction between donors and recipients we postulated earlier, by running placebo 
regressions for different lags and leads of the aid variables (Online Appendix B, Table B6). In 
the full sample, none of the aid coefficients is significant. In the reduced sample, two out of 
nine coefficients become significant, but small in value terms and with an unexpected sign. 
We thus consider that these results are spurious and that overall, this exercise confirms that 
the strategic interaction happens within a given year.  
We finally examine in more detail what drives our results. Is it the access to climate aid or 
changes in its amount that affect recipients’ statements in favor of the donors? Are donors 
rather trying to avoid negative statements or to promote positive ones? To address the first 
question we decompose the aid variables into ‘Dummy (Aid)’, an indicator variable for 
whether there has been any aid flowing from the donor to the recipient in a given year, and 
our previous ‘ln(Aid)’, limited now to strictly positive values of aid. While the results for 
switches between aid and no aid are significant for both adaptation and mitigation aid, they 
are fully insignificant when looking merely at the amount of aid (see Online Appendix B, 
Tables B7 and B8). This suggests that the former is driving our results. Indeed, this was to be 
expected given that in our data, the switch from no climate aid to some climate aid leads to 
much greater relative changes than any additions or reductions once aid is provided to a 
country (see the discussion of the results of Table 1 above). Furthermore, only 47 and 28 
recipients have ever gotten mitigation or adaptation aid, respectively, out of our total sample 
of 129 developing countries. This reduces the sample size in Table B8 from an earlier 5110 to 
just 198 for adaptation aid, and from 15330 to 550 for mitigation aid. Since this may 
obviously also affect the significance level, the results based on strictly positive aid values 
need to be interpreted with some caution. Overall, the results are not surprising and in line 
with the outcomes presented earlier.  
However, when differentiating between the relationship of aid and supportive statements on 
the one side, and aid and critical statements on the other side, we do obtain some unexpected 
results. Table 4 presents the corresponding estimations for the full sample using PPML. All 
aid coefficients are now much higher than before, positive and significant. These results are 
robust to alternative estimation methods such as Tobit or OLS (not shown). 
Regarding the relationship between climate aid and supportive statements, the only change is 
the size of the coefficient. As shown in Regressions 2 and 3 the elasticity of supportive 
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statements with respect to both adaptation and mitigation aid is now 0.13, which is 40-50 
times higher than in Table 1. Given the large relative change we often observe in these aid 
categories; these are huge effects. For example, if a recipient moved from no climate aid to an 
amount of 200’000 USD in the following year—a typical change that lies between the median 
increase of adaptation and mitigation aid in our sample—the number of supportive statements 
for the relevant donor would multiply by about 5, ceteris paribus.18  
Table 4: Separate regressions for positive and negative statements  
Dependent variables: (1) 
ln(Supportive 
statements) 
(2) 
ln(Supportive 
statements) 
(3) 
ln(Supportive 
statements) 
(4) 
ln(Critical 
statements) 
(5) 
ln(Critical 
statements) 
(6) 
ln(Critical 
statements) 
Variables for Aid: Total  
aid 
Adaptation  
aid 
Mitigation  
aid 
Total  
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
        
ln(Aid) 0.0465*** 0.1288*** 0.1257*** 0.0324* 0.1165*** 0.0928*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient 0.0349*** 0.0907*** 0.0240*** 0.0431*** 0.1102*** 0.0363*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.0001*** -0.0008*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0010*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Interventions donor 0.0072*** 0.0276*** 0.0064*** 0.0090*** 0.0169*** 0.0093*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions donor2 -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.00001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001** -0.00001*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Trade relationship 0.5457 0.3935 0.8761 -0.0527 -18.7236** 0.2111 
 (0.72) (0.86) (0.54) (0.98) (0.03) (0.90) 
Democracy 0.0928 -0.1812 0.0829 0.0922 -0.4286 0.0775 
 (0.59) (0.64) (0.57) (0.62) (0.19) (0.66) 
UN voting 1.8114*** -0.2575 0.8268 0.2424 -0.5625 -0.3392 
 (0.00) (0.76) (0.20) (0.66) (0.35) (0.58) 
Vulnerability 11.0274 42.9437 13.5080 -16.7096 -24.6765 -13.8888 
 (0.28) (0.14) (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) (0.31) 
ln(GDP per capita) -2.4741*** -4.4723 -2.4997*** 0.6521 5.0933* 0.4415 
 (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.52) (0.10) (0.66) 
       
Observations 15340 5120 15340 15340 5120 15340 
Number of clusters 130 130 130 130 130 130 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation used to account for censoring on the dependent 
variable. Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                                   
 
18 Remember that no aid is coded as 1 USD here due to the logarithmic transformation we use. An 
increase from no aid to 200’000 USD hence corresponds to a multiplication of the original number 
(=1) by 200’000. This leads to a multiplier for the number of supportive statements of ,W.XY∙ZWWWWW=4.888. 
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Regarding critical statements, the elasticities for mitigation and adaptation aid are similarly 
high. What is even more unexpected, however, is that the sign of the coefficients is positive 
rather than negative. Hence, a greater number of critical statements is associated with more, 
rather than less aid—quite the opposite of what our theory suggests. We are not aware of any 
discussion of such results in the UN voting literature either. What could explain this strong 
positive relationship? 
We believe that the most plausible explanation is that we are dealing with yet another type of 
the short-term reverse causality, which we deliberately did not purge out of the model to 
allow for strategic interactions in both directions. Interpreted in this way, one could imagine 
that donors try to appease highly critical opponents by giving them aid. If this interpretation 
were correct, what we observe would again reflect support buying, albeit not in the way we 
imagined in the first place. The results are thus in line with our main hypothesis on the 
strategic use of aid (H1), but the behavioral channel is quite unexpected. 
Apparently, the fact that we inadvertently aggregated two opposing effects to a single 
correlation in our earlier estimations (where we deduct the critical statements from the 
supportive ones to build our Support index) led to the substantially smaller coefficients we 
found there. In addition, the separate estimations now even lead to significant coefficients for 
general ODA. It seems that for general ODA the two opposing effects had just cancelled out 
in our earlier models. Yet, even now, the coefficients for total aid remain considerably smaller 
and somewhat less robust than for mitigation and adaptation aid. H2 on the predominant use 
of specific climate aid for strategic purposes in the negotiations is thus confirmed, although 
less clearly so than in our previous regressions. 
The overall picture we obtain suggests a situation in which donors use aid as an effective tool 
to solicit recipient support and avoid criticism in the negotiations, and/or in which recipients 
use support and criticism as strategies to obtain higher aid. We cannot distinguish between the 
two potential directions of the strategic interaction, but in any case, they both provide 
evidence for our support-buying hypothesis. The correlations between climate aid and 
recipients’ negotiation behavior are sizeable, especially when considering supportive and 
critical statements separately. Support buying may include cases in which the promise of aid 
is directly built into an international agreement such as the promise of the 100 billion USD in 
the context of the Copenhagen Accord. As expected, the effects we find are much stronger 
and much more robust for climate aid than for general ODA. However, as opposed to our 
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initial expectations, the strategic use of mitigation aid appears to be at least as important—if 
not more important—than the use of adaptation aid. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Based on a new dataset on member country interactions in the UNFCCC negotiations, we 
examine whether aid can buy support in international negotiation processes. The theoretical 
arguments follow the reasoning in the context of UN voting where “vote buying” is an 
academically long-established phenomenon. While aid may also increase a donor’s soft power 
and induce long-term positive relationships that eventually lead to closer alignment in 
international negotiations, we focus on short-term strategic interests and related “support 
buying”. Our three-dimensional panel analysis with donor-recipient dyad fixed effects, year 
fixed effects and clustering at the recipient level reveals that aid can indeed buy support, but 
that donors tend to use climate-related aid, rather than general ODA, for this purpose. We 
argue that this is due to both greater demand for and greater supply of this type of financial 
support, whose allocation is under the direct responsibility of the delegates who are experts in 
a very specific field (here: international climate policy). Based on a placebo test making use 
of the exogenous variation in aid inflows due to non-climatological disasters in other recipient 
countries, we show that the effects are not driven by random changes in aid unrelated to the 
context of the negotiations.  
The fact that we find a significant and robust relationship between climate-related aid and 
negotiation support clearly shows that despite the fact that most debates in this framework do 
not directly lead to a decision, the individual statements are taken seriously in the preparation 
of the final consensus—so seriously that donors are ready to pay for this, both bilaterally and 
as part of the common agreement being negotiated. The analogy between aid and negotiation 
support on the one hand, and aid and UNGA or UNSC voting alignment on the other hand 
shows that the strategic use of aid goes beyond what has been established in the aid literature 
so far. This should not only hold for the UNFCCC, but also for other similar international 
negotiations such as in the realm of the World Trade Organization. Our analysis also feeds 
into the broader debate on donor motivations for foreign aid. In this context, our results 
suggest yet another component of donor interest beyond the commercial and geopolitical 
interests considered in the aid allocation literature so far. 
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Section A: Data and Variables 
 
Section A describes data and variables starting with the Codebook for the negotiations-related 
database by Author (2017). Tables A1-A4 and Figure A1 display descriptive statistics of the 
negotiations-related data. Table A5 then presents an overview of the definition, sources and 
descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis. 
 
1. Extract from the codebook for dataset XXX (blinded for review) 
1.1 General dataset description 
This dataset contains dyadic data on how parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) react to other parties’ oral interventions during the negotiations. 
It is based on hand coding of summaries of the negotiations under the UNFCCC, and covers 
all meetings of the official UNFCCC bodies reported in the Earth Negotiation Bulletins 
(ENBs) between February 1995 (11th Session of the INC in New York) and December 2013 
(COP19 in Warsaw). The data covers not only the annual meetings of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, but also meetings of the permanent subsidiary bodies to the 
Convention (in charge of implementing its provisions and of providing scientific and 
technological guidance) and of ad-hoc negotiation groups established on a temporary basis to 
debate new agreements. It also covers meetings of specific technical workshops convened in 
order to inform the negotiation process. 
The UNFCCC meetings are usually summarized through daily ENB reports published by the 
International Institute of Sustainable Development, and can be downloaded from 
http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/. The ENBs have been chosen as the data source since they are seen 
as a detailed, consistent and objective source of information by many negotiators and 
observers in the climate talks, and because there are no publicly available official transcripts 
of the negotiations. 
The dataset was created for the SNSF-funded research project XXX (blinded for review), 
between 2013 and 2015. The dataset contains relational data between parties to the UNFCCC, 
which have been obtained by coding how parties to the UNFCCC react to other parties’ 
interventions: the observations in the dataset describe which countries speak on behalf of, 
support, agree with, delay, oppose, or criticize other countries’ statements or positions as 
reported in the ENBs. The observations also contain information regarding the topic or issue 
area and the negotiation meeting in which the respective statement was made.  
Four coders contributed to the data collection. A sample of ten ENB reports, covering the 
whole period from the 1990s until the 2010s was independently coded by all coders at the 
beginning of the process, in order to validate the codebook and ensure that the results were 
consistent. The findings, and eventual differences across the coders, were subsequently 
discussed to ensure that all have the same understanding of how to interpret the coding rules. 
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Along the main coding process, other ENB issues at random were double-coded to ensure that 
coding still remained consistent over time, and to allow for testing of inter-coder reliability. 
Inter-coder reliability was tested using Cohen’s kappa. For the main variable, coding the types 
of dyadic interactions between pairs of countries, Kappa between pairs of coders ranged from 
0.77 to 0.98, which indicates substantial to almost perfect reliability.19 More information 
about the dataset can be found in Author (2017).  
1.2 Variable description 
Country 1: Country (or country group) that says something on behalf of, states something 
with, agrees with, supports, delays the proposal of, opposes to or criticizes Country 2. For the 
purpose of this article, only DAC recipient countries have been kept in the Country 1 sample. 
Country 2: Country (or country group) whose position or statement is being supported, 
agreed with, criticized, etc. by Country 1. For the purpose of this article, only DAC donor 
countries have been kept in the Country 2 sample. 
Relation: The type of reaction of Country 1 to a statement/position by Country 2: speaking 
on behalf of, support, agreement, delaying proposal, opposition, or criticism. Detailed 
descriptions of the individual types of relations can be found in section 1.3 below.  
Conference: Place and year of meeting of the UNFCCC bodies (includes not only COP 
meetings, but also meetings of its subsidiary bodies). 
Topic: Issue area to which the statements by Country 1 and Country 2 refer: Mitigation, 
adaptation, finance, etc. This information has not been used for this article. 
Comment: Usually quotes the text that shows the coded relationship (in quotation marks). 
May also include comments regarding the coding.  
ENB Nr: Number of the Earth Negotiation Bulletin from which the relationship was coded. 
ENB_obs: Observation ID within the respective ENB Nr. This variable consists of the 3-digit 
ENB issue number followed by an observation counter within that ENB.  
1.3 Description of coded relationships 
On behalf of: when Country 1 speaks on behalf of or for Country 2. In this case, it is clear 
that Country 1 and Country 2 (and probably together with a larger group of parties) has 
previously coordinated a common position, which is being presented by Country 1 for the 
whole group. On behalf of is not coded when a member of an established coalition (such as 
the EU or the G77) speaks on behalf of this coalition (e.g., “Grenada, on behalf of AOSIS…” 
is coded simply as a statement by AOSIS). In this case, the membership of these coalitions is 
                                                   
 
19 Landis, J.R. and Koch, G.G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. 
Biometrics 33(1): 159-174. 
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already fixed, and it is clear that if the coalition makes a statement, all of its members have 
already agreed to this position.  
Example: 
- “PANAMA, also speaking for Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay 
and the Dominican Republic, stressed the importance of making progress on REDD 
(…)” (ENB No. 462).  
 
Support: is used when the text explicitly says that Country 2 (or its statement) was supported 
by Country 1, even when this support is expressed in different sentences. 
Example: 
- “He (the EU) said additional effort should be made to reduce uncertainty in GWPs but 
that parties should use them if they wish. Japan supported the GWP position (…). 
Australia (…) also supported continued use of GWPs.” (ENB No. 2).  
 
Agreement: when several countries are reported to hold the same position on an issue. This 
may be a text like “several parties, including Country 1, Country 2 and Country 3, proposed 
…”. Agreement may be coded also when two different sentences refer to the same position 
being held by different countries, even though the relationship (agreeing with each other) is 
not explicitly written.  
Example: 
- “The EU, the US and CANADA stressed the need to ensure consistency with the 
capacity building aspects of other discussions on technology transfer and adaptation.” 
(ENB No. 145).  
 
Delaying proposal: when Country 1 proposes that Country 2’s idea or proposal be discussed 
at a later time.   
Examples: 
- “The EU recognized Kazakhstan’s aspiration to join Annex B, while highlighting the 
need to comply with legal requirements relating to Annex B amendments. She 
supported deferring the issue to COP/MOP 6.” (ENB No. 452). 
- “TOGO, supported by MALAYSIA, proposed adjourning until numbers were 
proposed” (ENB No. 74). 
 
 
Opposition: when the text reports Country 1 opposing the statement or position expressed by 
Country 2. This has also been coded when the word “opposition” is not explicitly mentioned, 
but it is clear from the statements that they oppose each other. 
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Examples: 
- “The G-77/CHINA supported this approach while the US, CANADA and JAPAN 
opposed it” (ENB No. 347). 
- “MEXICO underscored its commitment to mechanisms and processes that increase 
the participation of observers. (…) NIGERIA noted that although participation of 
stakeholders has been positive, the UNFCCC is an intergovernmental process.” (ENB 
No. 489). 
 
Criticism: when Country 1 directly criticizes Country 2 or its position / statement. 
Examples: 
- “He [the EU] said some developed countries, particularly the US, have not included 
binding measures in their proposals and emphasized the EU’s conviction that P&Ms 
should be included to fully encompass the Berlin Mandate and Geneva Declaration.” 
(ENB No. 42). 
- “The MALDIVES lamented that reliance on the phrase “form should follow function” 
[used by China] is slowing down the negotiations” (ENB No. 494).   
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2. Descriptive statistics of supportive and opposing statements by recipients towards 
donors 
 
Table A1: Types of interactions between donors and recipients 
 
Interaction No. of 
statements 
Percentage of 
total 
Supportive 1711 54.18 
   Agreement 1586 50.22 
   Support 88 2.79 
   On behalf of 37 1.17 
Opposing 1447 45.82 
   Opposition 1423 45.06 
   Criticism 24 0.76 
 
 
Table A2: Ten most active aid recipients 
 
Recipient No. of 
statements 
Percentage of 
total 
Saudi Arabia 313 9.91 
China 304 9.63 
Brazil 280 8.87 
India 206 6.52 
South Africa 123 3.89 
Tuvalu 115 3.64 
Colombia 113 3.58 
Bolivia 111 3.51 
Mexico 89 2.82 
Argentina 88 2.79 
 
 
Table A3: Ten most supportive aid recipients 
 
Recipient No. of 
supportive 
statements 
Total No. of 
statements 
Supportive 
statements as  
% of country’s 
statements 
Costa Rica 53 53 1.00 
Kazakhstan 19 19 1.00 
Samoa 14 14 1.00 
Papua New Guinea 39 41 0.95 
Guyana 15 16 0.94 
Chile 58 62 0.94 
Uruguay 14 15 0.93 
Mexico 82 89 0.92 
Indonesia 37 41 0.90 
Panama 22 25 0.88 
Note: Table based only on recipients with 10 or more interactions (54 out of 97 actively  
speaking recipients in dataset) 
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Table A4: Ten least supportive aid recipients 
 
Recipient No. of 
supportive 
statements 
Total No. of 
statements 
Supportive 
statements as  
% of country’s 
statements 
Oman 1 24 0.04 
Sudan 1 16 0.06 
Nicaragua 1 12 0.08 
Libya 1 10 0.10 
Jamaica 2 12 0.17 
Algeria 7 35 0.20 
Venezuela 15 73 0.21 
Zambia 3 13 0.23 
Bolivia 33 111 0.30 
Cuba 11 35 0.31 
Note: Table based only on recipients with 10 or more interactions (54 out of 97 actively  
speaking recipients in dataset) 
 
 
Figure A1: Evolution of supportive and opposing statements over time 
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3. Information on overall dataset
Table A5: General data and variable description 
Variable Definition Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Dependent variables 
Support index Sum of statements a recipient makes referring to a specific donor, by year, 
whereby each statement is weighted by the degree of support, from -3 
(criticism) to +3 (support or speaking on behalf). 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. As it includes 
negative numbers (-18 being the lowest), we add 19 before taking logs. 
20860 0.036 1.065 -18 20 Own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013). 
Unweighted support index Unweighted sum of supportive and opposing statements a recipient makes 
referring to a specific donor, by year. 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. As it includes 
negative numbers (-9 being the lowest), we add 10 before taking logs. 
20860 0.015 0.520 -9 10 Own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013). 
Supportive statements (Unweighted) sum of positive statements where a recipient agrees with, 
speaks on behalf of or supports a donor, by year. 
In some regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before creating 
the log, +1 was added to avoid zeroes. 
20860 0.096 0.469 0 12 Own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013). 
Critical statements (Unweighted) sum of negative statements where a recipient delays, opposes 
or criticizes a donor, by year. 
In some regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before creating 
the log, +1 was added to avoid zeroes. 
20860 0.080 0.520 0 15 Own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013). 
Main explanatory variables 
Total aid Bilateral ODA commitments made by donors to recipients (2014 constant 
prices, USD millions). 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before creating 
the log, we rescale it into US dollars and add +1 to avoid the zeroes. 
20860 54.851 259.594 0 11534.75 OECD (2016b) 
Total aid dummy Indicator for whether any bilateral ODA commitment was made by the 
respective donor to the respective recipient (1) or not (0), by year.   
20860 0.692 0.462 0 1 OECD (2016b) 
Adaptation aid Climate change related bilateral ODA commitments for adaptation (both as 
main and significant purpose; 2014 constant prices, USD millions). 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before creating 
the log, we rescale it into US dollars and add +1 to avoid the zeroes. 
5960 1.086 14.564 0 744.583 OECD (2016a) 
Adaptation aid dummy Indicator for whether any bilateral ODA commitment for adaptation was 
made by the respective donor to the respective recipient (1) or not (0), by 
year.   
5960 0.057 0.232 0 1 OECD (2016a) 
Mitigation aid Climate change related bilateral ODA commitments for mitigation of 
greenhouse gases (both as main and significant purpose; 2014 constant 
prices, USD millions). 
In most regressions, we use a logged version of this variable. Before creating 
the log, we rescale it into US dollars and add +1 to avoid the zeroes. 
17880 2.063 41.238 0 2625.284 OECD (2016a) 
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Variable Definition Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Mitigation aid dummy Indicator for whether any bilateral ODA commitment for mitigation was 
made by the respective donor to the respective recipient (1) or not (0), by 
year.   
17880 0.040 0.195 0 1 OECD (2016a) 
Control variables 
Interventions donor Overall number of oral interventions made by a donor during the UNFCCC 
negotiations, by year. In most regressions we use a squared version of this 
variable. 
20860 59.043 66.442 0 407 own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013) 
Interventions recipient Overall number of oral interventions made by a recipient during the 
UNFCCC negotiations, by year. In most regressions we use a squared 
version of this variable. 
20860 3.737 11.744 0 188 own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013) 
Dyadic interventions Total number of positional statements made by a recipient referring to a 
specific donor, by year. In most regressions we use a squared version of this 
variable. 
20860 0.176 0.843 0 27 own coding from 
IISD (2000-2013) 
Trade relationship The value of dyadic trade between the donor and the recipient (imports + 
exports, in constant 2011 USD) as a fraction of the recipient’s GDP.  
19540 0.063 0.791 0 63.84 United Nations (2016) 
Imports Bilateral imports by the donor from the recipient (millions constant 2011 
USD). We use a logged version of this variable, in which we rescale it to US 
dollars and add +1 before taking logs to avoid losing the zeroes. 
20860 1570.892 13604.07 0 444389.6 United Nations (2016) 
Exports Bilateral exports from the donor to the recipient (millions constant 2011 
USD). We use a logged version of this variable, in which we rescale it to US 
dollars and add +1 before taking logs to avoid losing the zeroes. 
20860 1059.594 7356.925 0 218822.8 United Nations (2016) 
Democracy Absolute difference between the donor’s and the recipient’s level of 
democracy, measured as the average between the Freedom House civil 
liberties and the Freedom House political rights indices (rescaled so that 
higher values mean higher civil liberties or political rights).   
20220 2.761 1.805 0 6 Freedom House 
(2015), obtained from 
QoG (2015) 
UN voting Voting similarity index (0-1) equal to (total number of votes where both 
states agree)/(total number of joint votes). It includes all votes and not only 
important votes. 
19485 0.717 0.218 0 1 Voeten (2013) 
Vulnerability Recipient vulnerability measured by the ND-GAIN index that captures a 
country's exposure, sensitivity and ability to adapt to the negative impact of 
climate change.  
16560 -0.023 0.169 -0.989 0.174 ND-ECI (2015) 
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2011 USD) of the recipient countries. We use a 
logged version of this variable. 
19340 8142.559 8235.965 492.607 48963.45 World Bank (2016) 
Instrumental variables 
IV2geophysical  Total number of people requiring immediate assistance during a period of 
geophysical disaster in any developing country excluding the current 
recipient and its neighbors, weighted by the disaster-hit countries’ share in 
the current donor’s aid for the past ten years. We use a logged version of this 
variable. 
20860 149.958 492.828 0 5195.093 CRED (2015) 
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Variable Definition Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
IVgeophysical Total number of people requiring immediate assistance during a period of 
geophysical disaster in any developing country excluding the current 
recipient, weighted by the disaster-hit countries’ share in the current donor’s 
aid for the past ten years. We use a logged version of this variable. 
17580 192.203 554.842 0 5195.093 CRED (2015) 
IV2complex Total number of people requiring immediate assistance during a period of 
complex disaster in any developing country excluding the current recipient 
and its neighbors, weighted by the disaster-hit countries’ share in the current 
donor’s aid for the past ten years. We use a logged version of this variable. 
20860 2.17954 7.920 0 73.490 CRED (2015) 
IVcomplex Total number of people requiring immediate assistance during a period of 
complex disaster in any developing country excluding the current recipient, 
weighted by the disaster-hit countries’ share in the current donor’s aid for the 
past ten years. We use a logged version of this variable. 
17580 2.708 8.797 0 73.490 CRED (2015) 
IV2natural Total number of people requiring immediate assistance during a period of 
natural (biological and geophysical) disaster in any developing country 
excluding the current recipient and its neighbors, weighted by the disaster-hit 
countries’ share in the current donor’s aid for the past ten years. We use a 
logged version of this variable. 
20860 154.991 492.379 0 5197.406 CRED (2015) 
IVnatural Total number of people requiring immediate assistance during a period of 
natural (biological and geophysical) disaster in any developing country 
excluding the current recipient, weighted by the disaster-hit countries’ share 
in the current donor’s aid for the past ten years. We use a logged version of 
this variable. 
17580 198.372 553.953 0 5197.406 CRED (2015) 
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Section B: Additional Statistical Tables 
Table B1: Buying support at the UNFCCC, with unweighted dependent variable 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Unweighted support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid) 0.0001 0.0023** 0.0031*** -0.0003 0.0037*** 
(0.62) (0.04) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient -0.0001 0.0027*** -0.0006 0.0032*** 0.0024*** 
(0.87) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.01) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.28) (0.39) (0.25) (0.43) (0.35) 
Interventions donor2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.51) (0.50) (0.34) (0.71) (0.39) 
Trade relationship 0.0020 0.0051 0.0024 0.0045 0.0047 
(0.58) (0.47) (0.55) (0.49) (0.48) 
Democracy -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 
(0.83) (0.80) (0.88) (0.93) (0.83) 
UN voting 0.0179*** -0.0031 0.0147*** -0.0052 -0.0051 
(0.00) (0.70) (0.01) (0.52) (0.52) 
Vulnerability 0.2047 0.4304 0.2145* 0.4331 0.4470 
(0.11) (0.29) (0.09) (0.28) (0.27) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0317** -0.0493 -0.0340** -0.0492 -0.0504 
(0.04) (0.19) (0.03) (0.18) (0.18) 
Observations 15330 5110 15330 5110 5110 
Number of clusters 129 129 129 129 129 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.097 0.083 0.111 0.073 0.100 
Note: Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B2: Buying support at the UNFCCC, parsimonious models 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid) 0.0000 0.0024** 0.0033*** -0.0004 0.0039*** 
(0.85) (0.03) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient 0.0003 0.0032*** -0.0004 0.0036*** 0.0030*** 
(0.66) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00002*** -0.0001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.29) (0.32) (0.27) (0.33) (0.28) 
Interventions donor2 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.88) (0.43) (0.38) (0.62) (0.34) 
Observations 20860 5960 17880 5960 5960 
Number of clusters 149 149 149 149 149 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.084 0.079 0.101 0.070 0.095 
Note: Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B3: Buying support at the UNFCCC, with different control variables 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation aid 
ln(Aid) 0.0001 0.0014 0.0048*** 0.0001 0.0025** 0.0033*** 
(0.64) (0.32) (0.00) (0.63) (0.03) (0.00) 
Dyadic interventions -0.0086 0.0299 -0.0219 
(0.60) (0.20) (0.23) 
Dyadic interventions2 -0.0011 -0.0071** -0.0004 
(0.27) (0.04) (0.67) 
Interventions recipient -0.0001 0.0031*** -0.0006 
(0.90) (0.00) (0.34) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.00001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.24) (0.43) (0.21) 
Interventions donor2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.72) (0.53) (0.51) 
Trade relationship 0.0029 0.0055 0.0042 
(0.52) (0.48) (0.45) 
ln(Imports) 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0001 
(0.85) (0.63) (0.76) 
ln(Exports) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
(0.16) (0.51) (0.14) 
Democracy 0.0001 0.0023 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0010 -0.0006 
(0.96) (0.43) (0.97) (0.63) (0.71) (0.66) 
UN voting 0.0175*** -0.0092 0.0145** 0.0189*** -0.0046 0.0155** 
(0.01) (0.22) (0.01) (0.00) (0.59) (0.01) 
Vulnerability 0.2700* 0.4420 0.3018* 0.2299 0.4998 0.2402* 
(0.08) (0.35) (0.05) (0.10) (0.27) (0.09) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0453** -0.0556 -0.0496** -0.0358** -0.0522 -0.0382** 
(0.05) (0.19) (0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.03) 
Observations 15330 5110 15330 15340 5120 15340 
Number of clusters 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.055 0.072 0.079 0.095 0.080 0.108 
Note: Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B4: Regressions with multi-way clustering 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid) 0.0001 0.0026 0.0033*** -0.0003 0.0042*** 
(0.70) (0.15) (0.00) (0.14) (0.01) 
Interventions recipient -0.0001 0.0030** -0.0006 0.0035** 0.0026** 
(0.93) (0.02) (0.44) (0.02) (0.02) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00001* -0.0001*** -0.00001* -0.0001** -0.0001*** 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.00) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.26) (0.56) (0.27) (0.51) (0.60) 
Interventions donor2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.81) (0.61) (0.53) (0.76) (0.54) 
Trade relationship 0.0021 0.0050 0.0026 0.0043 0.0046 
(0.73) (0.50) (0.68) (0.53) (0.51) 
Democracy -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0012 
(0.83) (0.70) (0.88) (0.81) (0.72) 
UN voting 0.0192** -0.0033 0.0157** -0.0056 -0.0055 
(0.02) (0.85) (0.05) (0.78) (0.75) 
Vulnerability 0.2445 0.5252 0.2550 0.5277 0.5440 
(0.13) (0.29) (0.11) (0.27) (0.27) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0367* -0.0548 -0.0392* -0.0544 -0.0561 
(0.06) (0.23) (0.05) (0.22) (0.22) 
Observations 15330 5110 15330 5110 5110 
Number of clusters (recipients) 129 129 129 129 129 
Number of clusters (donors) 10 10 10 10 10 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.095 0.081 0.108 0.071 0.100 
Note: Clustering at recipient and donor level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B5: First stage results for Table 3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables for 
the 1st stage: 
Total aid Total aid Adaptation 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Instrumental variables: IV2geoph IVgeoph IV2complex IVcomplex IV2natural IVnatural 
ln(IV) -0.1376*** -0.2445*** -0.1894*** -0.1792*** -0.0465 -0.0788** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02) 
Interventions recipient 0.0145* 0.0140 0.1991*** 0.2037*** 0.1566*** 0.1608*** 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions donor 0.0148*** 0.0144*** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0028** 0.0026* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.99) (0.99) (0.05) (0.06) 
Interventions donor2 -0.00002*** -0.00002*** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.00001** 0.00001** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade relationship -0.0474 -0.1235 -0.3380 -0.3293 -0.1442 -0.1395 
(0.93) (0.80) (0.37) (0.38) (0.64) (0.65) 
Democracy -0.2292 -0.2782 -0.1579 -0.1575 -0.0337 -0.0330 
(0.24) (0.16) (0.40) (0.42) (0.59) (0.61) 
UN voting 0.1150 0.0281 -0.6885 -0.6917 1.0516*** 1.0983*** 
(0.80) (0.95) (0.11) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) 
Vulnerability -1.9101 0.2429 0.0886 0.1584 -3.3325 -3.3756 
(0.81) (0.98) (0.99) (0.99) (0.46) (0.47) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.2252 -0.4386 0.6686 0.6990 0.7487* 0.7575* 
(0.88) (0.77) (0.51) (0.51) (0.06) (0.07) 
Observations 15330 15083 5110 5060 15330 15083 
Number of clusters 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.007 0.008 0.035 0.036 0.084 0.086 
Kleibergen-Paap F 27.220 47.740 8.333 7.145 2.688 5.583 
Note: Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B6: Main results of regressions with lags and leads of aid 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid), 1-year lag -0.0000 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0005** -0.0000 
(0.78) (0.28) (0.93) (0.05) (0.93) 
Observations 15330 3800 14090 5110 5110 
Number of clusters 129 127 129 129 129 
ln(Aid), 2-year lag 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0006 
(0.21) (0.89) (0.91) (0.21) (0.36) 
Observations 15330 2520 12830 5110 5110 
Number of clusters 129 126 129 129 129 
ln(Aid), 1-year lead 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0015* 
(0.33) (0.12) (0.54) (0.71) (0.08) 
Observations 14070 5140 14070 3850 3850 
Number of clusters 129 129 129 129 129 
Note: Table shows results for the main explanatory variable (aid) in separate regressions using different 
lags and leads. The effect of control variables (same set as those shown in Table 1) is not reported. All 
regressions with year and dyad fixed effects, and clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B7: Regressions with dummies for aid provision 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Dummy (Aid) 0.0011 0.0359** 0.0497*** -0.0021 0.0638*** 
(0.54) (0.03) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) 
Interventions recipient -0.0001 0.0029*** -0.0006 0.0035*** 0.0026*** 
(0.92) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.01) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.24) (0.47) (0.20) (0.49) (0.41) 
Interventions donor2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.73) (0.57) (0.55) (0.77) (0.42) 
Trade relationship 0.0021 0.0050 0.0026 0.0042 0.0047 
(0.59) (0.48) (0.56) (0.51) (0.49) 
Democracy -0.0003 0.0015 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0014 
(0.82) (0.60) (0.89) (0.75) (0.62) 
UN voting 0.0192*** -0.0031 0.0158*** -0.0054 -0.0056 
(0.00) (0.71) (0.01) (0.54) (0.50) 
Vulnerability 0.2446* 0.5294 0.2546* 0.5262 0.5420 
(0.08) (0.24) (0.07) (0.24) (0.23) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0367** -0.0548 -0.0390** -0.0536 -0.0561 
(0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.18) (0.17) 
Observations 15330 5110 15330 5110 5110 
Number of clusters  129 129 129 129 129 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.095 0.081 0.110 0.070 0.103 
Note: Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B8: Regressions with only strictly positive values for aid 
Dependent variable: 
ln(Support index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables for Aid: Total 
aid 
Adaptation 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
Total 
aid 
Mitigation 
aid 
ln(Aid) 0.0002 0.0090 -0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0027 
(0.65) (0.35) (0.98) (0.15) (0.73) 
Interventions recipient 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0039*** 0.0038*** -0.0022 
(0.67) (0.86) (0.00) (0.00) (0.72) 
Interventions recipient2 -0.00002*** -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001*** -0.0001 
(0.00) (0.35) (0.36) (0.00) (0.31) 
Interventions donor -0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0023* 0.0002 -0.0004 
(0.46) (0.23) (0.08) (0.30) (0.82) 
Interventions donor2 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.54) (0.69) (0.16) (0.54) (0.51) 
Trade relationship 0.0029 0.4652 0.4631 0.0047 0.8590 
(0.51) (0.51) (0.45) (0.52) (0.16) 
Democracy 0.0002 0.1191 -0.0066 0.0000 0.1602** 
(0.88) (0.19) (0.82) (1.00) (0.05) 
UN voting 0.0228*** 0.2176 0.1350 -0.0097 -0.0628 
(0.00) (0.61) (0.29) (0.33) (0.82) 
Vulnerability 0.2321 3.3746 1.0496 0.5878 2.9885 
(0.16) (0.61) (0.61) (0.31) (0.63) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0409* 1.2201 -0.3129* -0.0645 1.1135 
(0.06) (0.30) (0.07) (0.23) (0.29) 
Observations 10890 198 550 3677 213 
Number of clusters  128 28 47 122 28 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. within R-squared 0.135 0.074 0.153 0.063 0.105 
Note: In this table, the sample is limited to observations with strictly positive values of aid (Aid >0). 
Clustering at recipient level. P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
